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Landerholm: Rodriguez v. Hayes

CASE SUMMARY
RODRIGUEZ V. HAYES:
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR IMMIGRANTS IN PROLONGED
DETENTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

At any given time, the United States government has more
than 32,000 beds in more than 350 facilities nationwide for the
purpose of housing immigrants awaiting removal.1 But how long
does the government detain these people without granting them
an opportunity to contest their detention? Mr. Tijani was held for
two years and eight months,2 Mr. Nadarajah for almost five years,3
1

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009 Immigration Detention
Reforms,
Aug.
6,
2009,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/2009_immigration_detention_reforms.htm.
2
Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit observed that Mr.
Tijani’s more-than-two-year detention under the expedited removal detention statute, 8
U.S.C. § 1226, was far from expeditious, stating that it was “constitutionally doubtful that
Congress may authorize imprisonment for this duration . . . .” Id. at 1242. The government
was ordered to release him on bond “unless the government establishes [in a prompt
hearing] that he is a flight risk or will be a danger to the community.” Id.
3
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit started
its opinion with the following facts:
Starting at age 17, Ahilan Nadarajah was repeatedly tortured in Sri Lanka. He fled
to the United States where he was detained upon arrival. He applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Twice, the government's arguments against the grant of immigration relief have been
rejected and Nadarajah has been awarded relief by an immigration judge. This
decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Yet, the government
continues to detain Nadarajah, who has now been imprisoned for almost five years
despite having prevailed at every administrative level of review and who has never
been charged with any crime. We order that a writ of habeas corpus issue, and that
he be released on appropriate conditions during the pendency of any further
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Mr. Casas-Castrillon for nearly seven years,4 and Mr. Rodriguez
for more than three years.5
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
chooses to keep many immigrants incarcerated while they await
the results of their hearings before immigration judges, appeals to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),6 or second appeals to the
federal courts of appeals.7 Starting with Zadvydas v. Davis8 in
2001, federal courts have been facing the question of whether
such lengthy detentions are permissible under either the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or the U.S. Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas held that indefinite
detention “would raise serious constitutional concerns”9 and
decided to construe the prolonged-detention statute at issue “to
proceedings.
Id. at 1071.
4
Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The
Ninth Circuit described the facts as follows:
Luis Felipe Casas-Castrillon (Casas) is a native and citizen of Colombia and has
been a legal permanent resident of the United States since 1990. He was served
with a notice to appear and detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
in August 2001, following his release from a state prison for a conviction on an auto
burglary charge. An immigration judge (IJ) found that Casas was a removable alien
because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that “[a]ny alien who . . . is convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude . . . is deportable”). Casas appealed this
determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the removal
order in July 2002.
From that time until the present, Casas has remained in the continuous custody of
the federal government while he has pursued various avenues of relief from removal
in the federal district court and the court of appeals, some successful and some not.
While he has sought judicial review, his removal has been stayed by court orders for
much of the period from 2002 to the present. As of the time that this opinion is filed,
Casas is now back before the BIA after this court granted his petition for review of
his final order of removal. During this nearly seven-year period of detention, it is
unclear what, if any, opportunity Casas has had to argue to a neutral decision maker
that his detention is unnecessary because he does not pose a danger to the
community or a flight risk.
Id. at 944-45 (footnotes omitted).
5
Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010).
6
The BIA is part of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) of the
Department of Justice. It sits in Falls Church, Virginia, and its members are appointed by
the Attorney General. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 744 (5th ed. 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2008)).
7
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 818 (5th ed. 2009).
8
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
9
Id. at 682.
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contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation.”10 The Court
thereafter set six months as the presumptively reasonable time for
detention, after which an alien should be provided with a bond
hearing and a right to challenge his or her continued detention.11
Since the Zadvydas decision,12 the Ninth Circuit has revisited
and interpreted the high Court’s holding four times,13 extending the
holding to various types of non-citizen detentions and each time
requiring the government to justify the prolonged detention by
granting the detainee a hearing.14 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit heard
a fifth case, Rodriguez v. Hayes,15 in which it confronted a new
and crucial issue: whether to certify a class action on behalf of
immigrants challenging their prolonged detentions as violations of
their due-process rights under Zadvydas. In a succinct, twosentence order, the district court denied class certification without
explanation.16 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court and allowed the action to go forward as a class action.17
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Born in Mexico, Alejandro Rodriguez immigrated to the United
States in 1979 when he was one year old.18 He became a lawful
permanent resident19 at the age of nine.20 In April 2004, he was
10

Id.
Id. at 701 (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”).
12
Subsequent to Zadvydas, in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), the Court
expanded Zadvydas to apply to undocumented immigrants in detention.
13
Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (applied
Zadvydas, like Prieto-Romero, to criminal aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and
ordered that Casas-Castrillon be given an individualized hearing to determine whether he
was a flight risk or a danger to the community, i.e., whether his continued detention was
justified); Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (extending Zadvydas to
criminal immigrants detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, but upholding detention because
petitioner had been granted a hearing and his removal was reasonably foreseeable under
the circumstances); Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying six-month
Zadvydas framework to expedited removal detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c));
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Zadvydas to entering
asylum seeker detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)).
14
Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d 942; Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d 1053; Tijani, 430 F.3d
1241; Nadarajah, 443 F.3d 1069.
15
Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010).
16
See Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1112.
17
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1111.
18
Id.
19
The term “lawful permanent resident” (LPR) is technically defined as “aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M.
11
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arrested and charged with removability based on past drug and
theft convictions21 and was detained by the Department of
Homeland Security.22 During his more-than-three-year detention,
he received three “custody reviews”23 from ICE that did little more
than determine, in writing, to continue his detention.24 However,
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 250 (5th ed. 2009). Synonymous
terms include “permanent resident aliens” and “green card holders.” Id. The so-called
“green card,” the credit-card-sized identification of LPR status, must be periodically
renewed to maintain LPR status. Id. LPRs are eligible to apply for citizenship after five
years of residence if they satisfy other statutory requirements. See id. at 1306-07.
20
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1111.
21
In 1998, Mr. Rodriguez pled guilty to a charge of unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle under section 10851(a) of the California Vehicle Code, for which he was sentenced
to two years. Five years later, in 2003, he pled no contest to a charge of possession of a
controlled substance under California Health and Safety Code section 11377(a), for which
he received five years of formal probation under the conditions of California Proposition 36.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, Garcia v. Hayes, No. CV07 3239 VAD (C.D. Cal.
May
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/garciavhayes_habeaspetition.pdf.
22
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1111-12.
23
These three reviews presumably consisted of an ICE agent reading through
Rodriguez’s file and issuing a “decision to continue detention” without ever interviewing or
giving Mr. Rodriguez a hearing. Mr. Rodriguez was only given a questionnaire that asked
about his family members, employment experience, and any outstanding probation
requirements. Even though he complied with this questionnaire, documenting his
employment history as a dental assistant as well as his extensive family ties, including his
U.S. citizen father and sister and his lawful permanent resident (LPR) mother and brother,
ICE denied his request for release. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10-11, Garcia v.
Hayes, No. CV07 3239 VAD (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2007), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/garciavhayes_habeaspetition.pdf.
The issue of ICE “custody reviews,” also known as Post-Order Custody Reviews
(POCRs), was discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Casas-Castrillon, where the court
rejected them as inadequate substitutes for a bond hearing. The court stated:
The only evidence in the record showing that Casas has received any procedural
review relates to a file review he received in November 2005. At that time, two
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field officers filled out a “Post-Order
Custody Review Worksheet” and recommended that Casas remain in custody
because he “would be a flight risk,” a determination that was then approved by
an ICE field director. Although these ICE officials reviewed Casas’ record when
making their determination, they did not interview him personally or by telephone.
It is not clear from the record whether Casas was even notified of this impending
review or whether he was given an opportunity to contest the facts on which the
ICE officials based their decision. There is no indication that he had a right to an
administrative appeal. This review falls far short of the procedural protections
afforded in ordinary bond hearings, where aliens may contest the necessity of
their detention before an immigration judge and have an opportunity to appeal
that determination to the BIA.
Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (footnote
omitted) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d); Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38-40 (B.I.A.
2006)).
24
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10-11, Garcia v. Hayes, No. CV07 3239
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during this three-year period, Rodriguez received neither an
explanation of nor an opportunity to challenge the government’s
decision to detain him.25
On May 16, 2007,26 Rodriguez filed a petition for habeas
corpus against the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, ICE, and the head officials of various aliendetention facilities.27
Unlike the typical habeas petitioner,
Rodriguez challenged not only the constitutionality of his own
detention, but also the detention of the following class:
[A]ll non-citizens detained within [the Central District of
California] who 1) are or will be detained for longer than six
months pursuant to one of the general detention statutes
pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial
review, and 2) have not been afforded a hearing to determine
whether their prolonged detention is justified.28

After Rodriguez filed a motion for class certification in the
district court, ICE responded by releasing him pursuant to an
order of supervision and, thereafter, filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the case had become moot.29 In a two-sentence
order, the district court denied both Rodriguez’s motion for class
certification and the government’s motion to dismiss.30 Rodriguez
thereafter appealed the denial of class certification.31
The central question for the Ninth Circuit was whether to
certify this habeas class action.32 The court answered this in the
affirmative,33 finding that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 had been met, including the requirements of Rule
VAD
(C.D.
Cal.
May
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/garciavhayes_habeaspetition.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Between 2004 and 2007, an immigration judge determined that Rodriguez was
subject to mandatory removal based on either of his past drug or theft offenses. Rodriguez
appealed, and the BIA reversed the IJ’s finding that he was removable on the basis of his
drug offense but upheld his removal under the theft conviction. Rodriguez then appealed
that finding to the Ninth Circuit and at the same time filed the habeas petition and motion
for class certification. The Ninth Circuit stayed his removal pending its decision in the
habeas action. Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1111-12.
27
Id. at 1112.
28
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No 08-56156), 2008 WL 4726528.
29
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1112.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1112-13.
33
Id. at 1126.
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23(a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
class representation)34 and of Rule 23(b)(2), which authorizes
class treatment if injunctive or declaratory relief sought is
“appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”35
III. ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
A.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS: STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
APPROPRIATENESS OF CLASS DEFINITION

First, the court addressed the standard of review it should use
to evaluate the district court’s denial of class certification.36
Normally, on review of a class-certification decision, an appellate
court grants a certain amount of deference to the lower court and
reviews the record simply for abuse of discretion.37 However, if
the lower court’s order was not supported by sufficient findings —
as in Rodriguez, where the lower court made no findings
whatsoever — the court of appeals may evaluate the question of
class certification for itself, with less deference to the lower court’s
opinion.38
The court next acknowledged that the proposed class of noncitizen detainees was adequately defined.39 Although the class
members were detained under different statutes (and, therefore,
might not fall into a single class), the court found Rodriguez’s
class definition to be adequate, agreeing that the “general
34

Rule 23(a) provides that a class may be certified only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
35
Rule 23(b) provides in part that:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: . . . (2) the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
36
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1112-13.
37
Id. (citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.
2001), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)).
38
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1113 (citing Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 946 (9th Cir.
2003); Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands,
Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001)).
39
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1113.
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[immigration] detention statutes” mentioned in the class definition
referred narrowly to three specific detention statutes.40 Turning to
each of these statutes separately, the court explained their
relevance as follows:
The three immigration detention statutes implicated by the
proposed class govern detention of aliens at different stages of
the admission and removal process. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
provides for discretionary detention of aliens pending a
determination of admissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 provides for
both discretionary detention generally and mandatory detention
for certain narrow categories of aliens pending a determination
of their removability. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) provides for mandatory
detention of aliens ordered removed during the 90 day removal
period and discretionary detention after the end of the removal
period.41

40

Id. The three general immigration statutes are the following sections of the INA: 8
U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226, 1231(a). The court noted some ambiguity with regard to the
applicability of a fourth detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), but stated that that
statute was of no practical importance as it dealt with providing for discretionary parole of
detainees.
41
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1113-14 (footnotes omitted).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides, in relevant part:
If the [asylum] officer determines at the time of the interview [upon arrival in the
United States] that an alien has a credible fear of persecution . . ., the alien shall
be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Westlaw 2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides as follows:
[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides as follows:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a) (Westlaw 2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is inadmissible by
reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this
title, . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, . . . is deportable
under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the
alien has been sentenced[sic] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or . . .
is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under
section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title when the alien is released, without regard to
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The court then explained that the underlying merits of
Rodriguez’s and the class’ claims were based on whether
prolonged detention without a bond hearing was authorized under
any of these statutes and, if so, whether such detention was
constitutional.42 Finally, the court reached the central question of
whether class certification was appropriate.43 The government
raised many challenges on appeal, including justiciability issues
such as mootness and ripeness, jurisdictional challenges, and a
claim of basic inappropriateness of certifying a class action on a
petition for habeas corpus.44 The court addressed each argument
in turn.
B.

JUSTICIABILITY CHALLENGES: MOOTNESS AND RIPENESS

Approximately one month after Rodriguez filed the classcertification motion in the district court, and shortly before filing its
opposition to the motion, the government decided to release

whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and
without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the
same offense.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c) (Westlaw 2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) provides as follows:
During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien. Under no
circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an
alien who has been found inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B)
of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(2) (Westlaw 2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) provides as follows:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community
or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in
paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6) (Westlaw 2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) provides as follows:
The removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and the alien
may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses
to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary
to the alien’s departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject
to an order of removal.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(1)(C) (Westlaw 2010).
42
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1114-15.
43
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1111.
44
Respondents-Appellees’ Answering Brief, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th
Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56156), 2008 WL 5053992.
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Rodriguez under an order of supervision.45 In light of his release,
the government filed a motion to dismiss the action as moot,
which the district court denied in a two-sentence order.46 On
appeal, Rodriguez argued that the government had attempted to
moot the class action by “picking off” the class representative.47
Without addressing this characterization of the government’s
conduct, the court of appeals noted that mootness was not a
ground for denying class certification; rather, it is a ground to
dismiss the action, which the lower court did not do.48
Furthermore, it continued, the case was not moot.49 The court
found the mootness issue in this case to be similar to that found in
the recent Supreme Court case Clark v. Martinez,50 where one of
the petitioners was released from detention and put on
discretionary parole while his suit was ongoing.51 The Supreme
Court found the petitioner in Clark to have a continuing personal
stake in the outcome, notwithstanding his release from custody,
because he was still subject to the government’s discretionary
authority to terminate his release.52
The Ninth Circuit noted that Rodriguez’s release was also

45

Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1117.
Id. at 1112.
47
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5-7, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-56156), 2008 WL 4726528. Rodriguez’s opening brief recites the evidence
of this “picking off” accusation: After Rodriguez was released under supervision, his
attorney filed a separate and similar class action habeas petition challenging the same
governmental conduct. The class representative of this action was a man named Mr. Jung
Jin Lee, who had been detained for more than two years with no detention hearing. Again,
shortly after filing the case, the government released Mr. Lee on supervision without any
explanation from ICE. Id. at 6-7. In its reply brief, the government stated that this
argument “is without merit.” See Respondents-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 22, Rodriguez
v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56156), 2008 WL 5053992.
48
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1117.
49
Id. at 1117-18.
50
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (extending Zadvydas to undocumented
immigrants).
51
The Rodriguez court quoted the Supreme Court:
46

If Benitez [one of the petitioners in Clark v. Martinez] is correct, as his suit contends,
that the Government lacks the authority to continue to detain him, he would have to
be released, and could not be taken back into custody unless he violated the
conditions of . . . or his detention became necessary to effectuate his removal . . . .
His current release, however, is not only limited to one year, but subject to the
Secretary's discretionary authority to terminate. . . . Thus, Benitez continue[s] to
have a personal stake in the outcome of his petition.
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 376 n.3 (2005)
(omitting citations and internal quotations, and adding emphasis)).
52
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1117; see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 376 n.3 (2005).
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subject to revocation at the government’s discretion.53
Furthermore, the court noted that Rodriguez’s release was subject
to many restrictions, including that he wear an ankle monitoring
device at all times and remain within fifty feet of his home from
7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. every night.54 Accordingly, the court found
the controversy to be live and not moot.55
The government next argued that class certification should be
denied because some of the claims of the proposed class were
not yet ripe.56 According to the government, the class claims were
not ripe for two reasons. First, “there is no indication yet that the
government is refusing to comply with Casas-Castrillon’s ruling.”57
Second, the proposed class itself “references future class
members.”58 The court disagreed with both points.59
The Ninth Circuit first stated that, even if the government
were complying with Casas-Castrillon by granting a bond hearing
to those immigrants detained for more than six months, it would
not affect the claims of class members who had not yet received
such hearings.60 As the court explained, if the government
complied with Casas-Castrillon (by giving some members valid
hearings), the size of the class would be reduced, but it would not
render the other class members’ claims unripe.61 Second, the
court made clear that there is nothing unusual or objectionable
about including future class members in a class.62 The court
explained that when these future persons become members of a
proposed class, their claims will necessarily be ripe.63 Thus,
neither ripeness nor mootness barred class certification.64
53

Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1118.
Id. (“The strict limitations on Petitioner’s freedom, therefore, provide an additional
reason why his case presents a live controversy.” Id. (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 238 (1968))).
55
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1117-18.
56
Id. at 1118 (“[A] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future
events that may not occur at all.” (quoting Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1096
(9th Cir. 2009))).
57
Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.
2008) is the most recent of the Ninth Circuit’s post-Zadvydas line of cases interpreting the
need for bond hearings.
58
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1118.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.; see, e.g., Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir.
1986); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1321-26 (9th Cir. 1985).
63
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1118.
64
Id.
54
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JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 306(A) OFTHE
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT
RESPONSIBILITY ACT

Perhaps as its strongest argument, the government
contended that Section 306(a) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)65 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA)) required a denial of class certification because it divests
federal courts (except the Supreme Court) of jurisdiction to grant
injunctive relief from removal or detention to anyone other than
certain individuals.66 This issue raises interesting constitutional
questions. Can Congress limit either the courts’ jurisdiction to
resolve habeas corpus claims or their power to grant injunctive
relief from these detention statutes?67 Can Congress eliminate
the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear class claims
completely? According to the government, that is exactly what
Congress did in 1996 with the passage of IIRIRA.68
The Ninth Circuit found the government’s contention to be
mistaken primarily for two reasons.69 First, the court noted that
section 1252(f) does not restrict the availability of declaratory
relief, and in this case, the class was seeking a declaration that, in
order to comply with the Constitution, detention under the general
65

8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(f) (Westlaw 2010).
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1118-19 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)); RespondentsAppellees’ Answering Brief at 11, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) (No.
08-56156), 2008 WL 5053992. IIRIRA section 306(a), codified at 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1),
provides as follows:
66

Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or
parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV
of this sub-chapter, as amended by [IIRIRA], other than with respect to the
application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under
such part have been initiated.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(f)(1) (Westlaw 2010).
67
The government explained its stance on the issue as follows:
Petitioner [Rodriguez] argues that Congress cannot strip courts of jurisdiction to
grant habeas corpus relief without specifically citing to the federal habeas statute. [ .
. . ] This argument lacks merit as it confuses the issue. Congress did not strip the
courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction, but rather acted to limit injunctive relief. Here,
Petitioner seeks an injunction requiring the Government to conduct bond hearings
for all class members. This is precisely the request that Section 1252(f)(1) bars.
Respondents-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 13, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th
Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56156), 2008 WL 5053992 (citation omitted).
68
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1118-19.
69
Id. at 1119.
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immigration statutes requires that class members receive a bond
hearing.70 Second, the court emphasized that section 1252(f)
“prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention
statutes, not injunction of a violation of the statutes.”71 The court
therefore agreed with Rodriguez that section 1252(f) did not apply
to bar injunctive relief for the proposed class.72
D.

APPROPRIATENESS OF HABEAS CORPUS CLASS ACTIONS

The last of the preliminary arguments addressed by the court
was whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Rumsfeld v. Padilla73
The
rendered class relief inappropriate in this instance.74
government contended that Padilla made class relief impossible
because it requires individual class members to bring their claims
against the various wardens overseeing their specific detention
and, therefore, does not allow one representative to bring suit
against all the wardens in the whole Central District of California.75
The government therefore suggested that, “‘at a jurisdictional
minimum,’ all proposed class members must be under the
immediate supervision of the same custodian.”76 While this
argument may be creative, the court rejected it as “baseless”77
70

Id. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit relied on the following reasoning: “Nor do we
agree with Respondents that Section 1252(f)’s ‘enjoin or restrain’ should be interpreted to
have the same scope as a different phrase, ‘enjoin, suspend or restrain,’ in the Tax
Injunction and Johnson Acts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342.” Id. The court stated that the
absence of the word “suspend” from § 1252(f) “suggests that Congress intended Section
1252(f)’s scope to be more limited than [those acts].” Id.
71
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1120 (emphasis added) (quoting Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d
873, 886 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that where “a petitioner seeks to enjoin conduct that
allegedly is not even authorized by the statute, the court is not enjoining the operation of
part IV of subchapter II, and § 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated.”), vacated on unrelated
grounds sub nom by Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005)).
72
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1120.
73
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (holding that in habeas petition
challenging present physical detention, “the default rule is that the proper respondent is the
warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some
other remote supervisory official.”).
74
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1121.
75
Id.
76
Id. (quoting Respondents-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 16, Rodriguez v. Hayes,
591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56156), 2008 WL 5053992).
77
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1121. The court explained as follows:
Respondents fail to recognize that Padilla specifically reserved the question of
whether the proper respondent in habeas challenges brought by “an alien detained
pending deportation” would be the immediate custodian of the alien. Padilla, 542
U.S. at 436 n.8, 124 S. Ct. 2711. We need not reach it because, even were the
Supreme Court's statement in Padilla applicable here, Respondents' argument is
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and pointed out various precedents in which analogous habeas
class actions have been maintained.78
E.

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 23

1.

Rule 23(a)

Since no preliminary issue precluded the action, the Ninth
Circuit was able to reach the question of whether the Rodriguez
class satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.79 Under the Rule, the party seeking class
certification has the burden of proving each of the four Rule 23(a)
requirements and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).80
The court began by examining the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
followed with a discussion of Rule 23(b)(2).
Rule 23(a) provides that a class may be certified only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.81

a.

Commonality

The commonality requirement is satisfied if the named plaintiff
shares at least one common question of law or fact with the
baseless. Respondents cite no authority or rationale for the proposition that we do
not have jurisdiction to provide class relief in a habeas corpus action that meets the
requirements for certification merely because class members are in the immediate
custody of different facilities. Such actions have been maintained previously against
single and multiple respondents.
Id.
78

Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (class of juveniles sought habeas
corpus relief from pre-trial detention); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115
(2d Cir. 1974) (class of young adults sought habeas corpus relief from confinement in state
reformatories)).
79
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1121-22.
80
Id. at 1122.
81
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The court did not analyze the “numerosity” requirement
because the government did not challenge this aspect of the class claim: “Respondents
challenge the proposed class’s compliance with all aspects of Rule 23 except the
numerosity requirement, which Respondents concede is met.” Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at
1122.
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grievances of the prospective class.82 This requirement ensures
“that absentee members are fairly and adequately represented”83
and that case management is practical and efficient.84
The court expressly found that the class met the commonality
requirement.85 Even though many of the class members were
detained under different immigration statutes and did not share
exactly the same issues of law or fact,86 they all raised a common
constitutional issue: whether “an individual [may] be detained for
over six months without a bond hearing under a statute that does
not explicitly authorize detention for longer than that time without
generating serious constitutional concerns.”87 The court also
mentioned that finding commonality in this case would further the
purposes of this requirement because it would increase judicial
efficiency by enabling the court to adopt a “uniform framework for
analyzing detainee claims to a bond hearing.”88 Finally, the court
pointed out that, whatever differences may exist among the class
members (e.g., their detention under different sections of the INA),
sub-classes might be formed as the lower court may find
appropriate.89
b. Typicality
The typicality requirement necessitates that the claims of the
class representative be typical of those of the class.90 This
requirement is satisfied “when each class member’s claim arises
from the same course of events, and each class member makes
similar legal arguments to prove the defendant’s liability.”91
Rodriguez’s claim seeking a bond hearing was found to be
“reasonably co-extensive with the claims of the class.”92 That his
detention was under a different statute from the detentions of
some other class members, that his challenge occurred at a
82

Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d
48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994)).
83
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1123.
88
Id.
89
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1123-24.
90
Id. at 1124.
91
Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001)).
92
Id.
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different stage in his removal proceedings (i.e., during the appeal
of his “aggravated felon” status determination to the Ninth Circuit),
and that he had been out on supervised release were all held to
be immaterial.93 They did not render his claim moot, nor did his
“aggravated felon” status make him any less entitled to a bond
hearing than other class members.94 Therefore, the court held
that Rodriguez’s claim was typical.95
c. Adequacy
For a class representative to satisfy the adequacy
requirement, various factors must be considered, including “the
qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an absence of
antagonism, a sharing of interests between representatives and
absentees, and the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive.”96
Because Rodriguez had alleged the qualifications of his counsel in
the district court and because respondents did not question those
allegations but merely challenged his adequacy by “re-asserting
their commonality and typicality arguments,”97 the court found no
reason to deny class certification due to lack of adequate
representation.98
2.

Rule 23(b)(2)

An action that meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) may
proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) if the primary relief
sought is declaratory or injunctive.99 The Ninth Circuit previously
found the 23(b)(2) requirement satisfied when “class members
complain of a pattern or practice that is generally applicable to the
class as a whole.”100 Rodriguez and the class challenged the
government’s practice of prolonged detention without providing a
bond hearing. As a remedy, the class sought injunctive and
declaratory relief requiring each class member access to a
constitutionally valid hearing before an immigration judge with the

93

Id.
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1124.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1125 (quoting Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998)).
97
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1125.
98
Id.
99
Id. (quoting Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir.
2001), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)).
100
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Walters, 145 F.3d at 1047).
94
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burden placed on the government to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the detention is justified, e.g., that the detainee is a
flight risk or poses a danger to the community.101 Accordingly, the
court held the class satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).102
F.

DISPOSITION

The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no reason to deny
class certification. The court, therefore, reversed and remanded
to the district court for further proceedings, leaving to the lower
court’s discretion whether the formation of sub-classes would be
appropriate.103
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
Rodriguez v. Hayes has real-life implications far more
significant than any of the legal issues it discussed. It is a
bombshell victory for immigrants’ rights and due process. By
allowing class certification, the Ninth Circuit is effectively holding
the government accountable to all immigrant detainees, which will
force ICE to change its detention policies to allow for bond
hearings on a broad scale.
In immigration proceedings, the vast majority of detainees are
unrepresented.104
Because non-citizens in immigration

101

The relief Rodriguez and the class sought is described as follows:

Petitioner’s requested relief includes the certification of the proposed class,
appointment of Petitioner’s counsel as class counsel, and injunctive and declaratory
relief providing all members of the class “constitutionally-adequate individual
hearings before an immigration judge . . . , at which Respondents will bear the
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner and each class
member is a sufficient danger or risk of flight to justify his detention in light of how
long he has been detained already and the likelihood of his case being finally
resolved in favor of the government in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 21, Garcia v.
Hayes, No. CV07 3239 VAD (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2007), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/garciavhayes_habeaspetition.pdf).
102
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1126.
103
Id.
104
A recent report to the American Bar Association, entitled “Reforming the
Immigration System: Proposals To Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and
Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases,” found that eighty-four percent of
detained respondents in immigration court do not have representation. See News Release,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, New Report to ABA Addresses Crisis Within Immigration
Removal
System
(Feb.
2,
2010),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/news_release.cfm?releaseid=870.
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proceedings have no constitutional right to counsel,105 most
detainees cannot afford to bring habeas petitions to challenge
their prolonged detention.106 By allowing class habeas relief, the
Ninth Circuit has made it possible for those immigrants who
cannot afford counsel to have their claims adjudicated. As the
Ninth Circuit explained, without class certification, “many of the
putative class members likely would not be able to adjudicate their
claimed need of a bond hearing,” and therefore, “class treatment
in this case is likely necessary to provide the remedy sought.”107
Furthermore, requiring the government to provide bond
hearings as a regular practice will promote transparency and
oversight of decisions that deprive people of their freedom. This
extends procedural due process to all immigrants, not just those
who can afford to bring suit. It will also likely result in fewer
prolonged detentions overall.
As another possible effect, this case could invite the Supreme
Court to reexamine its holding in Zadvydas, which was decided in
2001 by a narrow five-to-four majority with strong dissents by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Scalia would likely vote to
overturn Rodriguez and the other Zadvydas progeny because, in
his view, the Due Process Clause does not require any bond
hearing or any other procedural protection for a criminal or
inadmissible alien in removal proceedings, regardless of the
length of time in custody.108
105

See, e.g. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568-569 (6th Cir. 1975)
(discussing the right to counsel and holding that deportation proceedings are protected by
procedural due process so that the assistance of counsel is necessary only when depriving
counsel would deprive a non-citizen of fundamental fairness).
106
See News Release, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, New Report to ABA Addresses
Crisis Within Immigration Removal System (Feb. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/news_release.cfm?releaseid=870.
107
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1123.
108
See, e.g., Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Zadvydas:
Like a criminal alien under final order of removal, an inadmissible alien at the
border has no right to be in the United States. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 603 (1889). In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953), we upheld potentially indefinite detention of such an inadmissible alien whom
the Government was unable to return anywhere else. We said that “we [did] not
think that respondent's continued exclusion deprives him of any statutory or
constitutional right.” Id., at 215. While four Members of the Court thought that Mezei
deserved greater procedural protections (the Attorney General had refused to
divulge any information as to why Mezei was being detained, id., at 209), no Justice
asserted that Mezei had a substantive constitutional right to release into this country.
...
....
Mezei thus stands unexplained and undistinguished by the Court's opinion. We
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Finally, Rodriguez could incentivize Congress to finally and
fully reexamine U.S. immigration laws. President Obama has
listed comprehensive immigration reform as a priority on his
agenda for 2010.109 If Congress acts, it will be faced with the
choice of either revising the Immigration and Nationality Act to
codify the bond hearings as mandated by Rodriguez, imposing
other similar procedural safeguards, or attempting to statutorily
overrule Rodriguez and Zadvydas altogether.
V.

CONCLUSION

The court’s holding that class certification was appropriate will
force the government to grant hearings to non-citizen detainees
within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. The potential impact of
Rodriguez is enormous and will be felt by immigrants in the Ninth
Circuit and across the country. It could potentially lead to the end
of unjustified detentions of non-citizens for lengthy periods in
removal proceedings.
OTIS CARL LANDERHOLM*

are offered no justification why an alien under a valid and final order of removal-which has totally extinguished whatever right to presence in this country he
possessed--has any greater due process right to be released into the country than
an alien at the border seeking entry. Congress undoubtedly thought that both groups
of aliens--inadmissible aliens at the threshold and criminal aliens under final order of
removal--could be constitutionally detained on the same terms, since it provided the
authority to detain both groups in the very same statutory provision, see 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6). Because I believe Mezei controls these cases, and, like the Court, I also
see no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional impediment to the
discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 703-05 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109
See
generally,
The
White
House,
Issues,
Immigration,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
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